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Abstract We observe a substantial increase in foreign ownership in Sweden in the
1990s. Did that have any effect on relative demand for skilled labor? Has tech-
nology transfers—often associated with inward FDI—led to an increased demand
for skills due to skilled-biased technical change? Are there any grounds for the
concerns in the public Swedish debate that more skilled activities have been moved
to other countries where the headquarters are located? Estimating relative labor
demand at the firm level and using propensity score matching with difference-in-
difference estimation, we obtain support for that relative demand for skilled labor
tend to rise in non-multinationals (non-MNEs)—but not in multinationals
(MNEs)—that become foreign-owned. Other interesting findings are that larger
presence of foreign MNEs in an industry appears to have a positive impact on the
relative demand for skills in Swedish MNEs within the same industry and that the
elasticity of substitution between skilled and less-skilled labor seems to be lower in
MNEs than in non-MNEs.
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1 Introduction
The employment share of skilled labor, i.e., employees with a post-secondary
education, has grown continuously in Sweden over the last few decades. The
increasing skill share in the 1990s might be explained by a larger supply of skilled
labor owing to a heavy expansion of higher education in Sweden. Yet it seems that
factors on the demand side have dominated since at the same time we observe rising
relative wages of skilled labor.1 In particular, two factors on the demand side have
been emphasized in the literature, namely skilled-biased technological change and
increased import competition from low-wage countries, and numerous studies on
different countries have tried to quantify the importance of these factors.2
Another conceivable channel through which the increased internationalization
may affect the relative demand for skills is foreign direct investment (FDI). Swedish
headquartered multinational enterprises (MNEs) have been significant employers in
Swedish manufacturing for a long period of time. Hansson (2005) examines the
impact of their localization behavior (outward FDI) on relative labor demand in
their Swedish parents.3 He finds increased employment in affiliates in low-wage
countries to be positively related to skill upgrading in the Swedish parents. This
indicates that within Swedish MNEs, less-skilled activities are transferred to low-
wage countries. Changes in employment in affiliates in other high-wage countries
are, on the other hand, unrelated to parent skill upgrading. However, increased
inward FDI to Sweden is a characteristic feature of the 1990s, resulting in rapidly
growing foreign ownership.4 Does more inward FDI explain the increased relative
demand for skilled labor in Sweden in the 1990s?
The theory of MNEs assumes that MNEs possess firm-specific assets, such as
technological assets, that give them an advantage relative to indigenous firms. This is
necessary to compensate for the disadvantages they face in foreign countries and thus,
to be able to establish themselves abroad (Dunning 1977). It is often believed that
MNEs are important conveyers of technology internationally since one motive for FDI
is to profit from utilizing firm-specific technology intensive assets in many countries.
By transferring technology abroad, MNEs will affect technological change in their
host countries. Consequently, if inward FDI has an impact on technological change,
and if it is skill-biased, increased foreign ownership might have a positive influence on
host country relative demand for skilled labor. Parallel trends in Sweden in the 1990s
between rising shares of skilled labor, a growing wage differential between skilled and
less-skilled labor, and increased inward FDI suggest that the larger presence of foreign
affiliates is possibly an explanation for skill upgrading and rising inequality.
Another motive for FDI is technology sourcing. Technological capabilities of
indigenous firms give rise to country-specific advantages, which attract foreign
firms. If technology sourcing causes FDI, a reasonable assumption is that the
1 Section 2 discusses this more in depth.
2 Machin and Van Reenen (1998), Anderton and Brenton (1998), Hansson (2000) etc.
3 Similar studies on US and Japanese multinationals are found in Slaughter (2000) and Head and Ries
(2002).
4 See Fig. 1 in Sect. 2 below.
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acquired domestic firms keep the same skill mix after takeover, which means that
the relative demand for skills is unaffected by inward FDI.
The increased foreign ownership has aroused some anxiety in the Swedish public
debate. Jonung (2002) asserts that acquisitions of Swedish MNEs by foreign firms,
where the headquarters move abroad, entail less employment of skilled labor in
Sweden. He argues that when the headquarters leave, other functions using qualified
employees will also disappear. Activities such as research and development (R&D)
and advanced production will gradually be removed from Sweden. Increased inward
FDI is then negatively related to skill upgrading.
Lower relative demand for skilled labor in the presence of more foreign-owned
firms is also consistent with the recent MNE models where foreign affiliates are less
skill-intensive than their parents. The reason is that skill-intensive activities, such as
headquarter service and R&D, are assumed to be located in the parent country.
However, in these models, the implications of greater MNE activities on skill
upgrading and wage inequality are ambiguous (Markusen and Venables 1997).
Evidently, it may be argued that inward FDI has various, and sometimes
opposite, effects on relative demand for skilled labor, which highlight the need for
empirical work. The purpose of the paper is to examine the impact of growing
inward FDI and rising foreign-affiliate presence on skill upgrading and increased
wage inequality in Swedish manufacturing from 1993 to 2002.
The paper is related to, Feenstra and Hanson (1997), Blonigen and Slaughter
(2001) and Taylor and Driffield (2005) and we contrast our findings to theirs.5
Likewise, as in all these studies, we follow the approach by Berman et al. (1994)
and estimate a relative labor demand function controlling for technological change.
Unlike these studies, we have access to firm-level data, which is advantageous,
since the channels discussed above, through which inward FDI may affect relative
demand for skills, should mainly appear at the firm level. Feenstra and Hanson
(1997) and Blonigen and Slaughter (2001) are studies at the industry level that
capture such direct effects at the firm level, as well as indirect effects through
technology and wage spillovers from foreign-owned firms to indigenous firms
within the same industry. Moreover, Taylor and Driffield (2005) provide an
industry-level analysis, but they entirely focus on the indirect effects of the presence
of foreign-owned firms on domestic firms.
An improvement as compared to the previous literature estimating changes in
relative demand for skilled labor is that we are able to more appropriately take
changes in relative wages between skilled and less-skilled labor into account.
Access to a new, large data set on individual wages makes it possible to generate
relative wages at the industry level over the period studied.
5 Feenstra and Hanson (1997) use regional data at the industry level in Mexican manufacturing 1975–
1988. Blonigen and Slaughter (2001) and Taylor and Driffield (2005) are studies on developed countries,
the former on US manufacturing industries 1977–1994 and the latter on UK manufacturing 1983–1992. A
slightly different study on the same topic is Figini and Go¨rg (1999). Based on a model by Aghion and
Howitt (1998), they argue that there should be an inverted-U shape relationship between wage inequality
and the presence of foreign-owned firms; something for which they also find empirical support using Irish
data.
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To preview our result, there seem to be no grounds for the concerns that foreign-
owned firms move out skill-intensive activities from Sweden. If anything, the
relative demand for skilled labor appears to increase in non-MNEs that become
foreign-owned. In addition, we find that the larger presence of foreign MNEs in an
industry has a positive effect on the relative demand for skilled labor in Swedish
MNEs within the same industry, while it has no effect on non-MNEs. Moreover, the
elasticity of substitution between skilled and less-skilled labor is lower in MNEs
than in non-MNEs.
Domestic firms taken over by foreign firms are not randomly acquired, rather
their characteristics differ systematically from non-acquired firms. If these
characteristics also influence post-acquisition relative demand and are not controlled
for, biased estimates of the effects of foreign ownership on relative demand for
skills will arise. One method for dealing with likely endogenity problems is to
combine propensity score matching with difference-in-difference estimation.6
Therefore, as a complement to our standard labor demand analysis we also apply
such an approach, and when it comes to the post-acquisition relative labor demand
effects we arrive at similar results.
Recently, two studies have been published that use panel data at the
disaggregated level to examine the impact of foreign ownership on the relative
employment of skilled labor. Almeida (2007) carries out an analysis on Portuguese
firms during the 1990s and she finds no significant changes in the average education
in the workforce following foreign acquisitions. Huttunen (2007) investigates
Finnish manufacturing establishments 1988–2001 and her results are mixed. While
a regression model using the whole data shows that foreign acquisitions have no
effect on the share of highly educated workers in the plant’s employment, matching
and regression analysis on the matched sample indicates that there is a small
decrease in the share of highly educated workers after acquisitions.
The outline of the paper is the following. In Sect. 2.1, we present our data and
how foreign ownership and skill intensities in MNEs (Swedish and foreign-owned)
and non-MNEs have developed over the period studied. Among Swedish social
scientists there have been discussions about whether the growing employment of
skilled labor is due to factors on the supply or the demand side. In Sect. 2.2, we
contribute to that debate by showing some new estimates on the trend in relative
wages between skilled and less-skilled labor in Swedish manufacturing from 1993
to 2002, which we then plot against the employment share of skilled labor. From
this analysis we conclude that factors on the demand side dominate, and in Sect. 3,
we examine the effects of increased foreign ownership on relative demand for skills
in Swedish manufacturing. In Sect. 3.1 we set out a framework for studying relative
labor demand. Section 3.2 presents some empirical results from analyzing the
impact of foreign ownership on relative demand for skilled labor. Section 3.3
contains a brief overview of propensity score matching and difference-in-difference
estimation, and in Sect. 3.4, we report difference-in-difference matching results on
post-acquisition effects on the relative demand for skills. Section 4 summarizes and
concludes.
6 See, e.g., Blundell and Costas Dias (2000).
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2 Data and description
2.1 Foreign ownership and skill intensities in MNEs and non-MNEs
The data in our microeconomic database come from Statistics Sweden (SCB) and
the Swedish Institute for Growth Policy Studies (ITPS). The database enables us to
link information on the financial accounts of enterprises, register-based labor
statistics (i.e., education levels and incomes) and individual wage statistics.
Moreover, from 1993 and onwards, it is possible to divide firms into foreign-owned
firms, Swedish MNEs and other Swedish firms (non-MNEs). Here, we use a panel of
firms including all manufacturing firms with 50 employees or more.
Ever since the mid-1980s, there has been a steady increase in foreign ownership
in Swedish manufacturing (and in the business sector as a whole). Foreign-owned
firms are firms where foreigners possess more than 50% of the voting rights.
Figure 1 shows that in 1986, 12% of the manufacturing employment is in foreign-
owned firms, while this share has risen to 37% in 2002. Above all, after 1994, in
connection with the Swedish membership in the European Union (EU), foreign
ownership in Swedish manufacturing really seems to have taken off. Between 1994
and 2002, the share of employment in foreign-owned firms increased by more than
15 percentage points.
To a large extent, the limited foreign ownership until the mid-1980s can be
explained by legal impediments to foreigners owning Swedish firms and propriety.
The reason for these obstacles were in many cases purely protectionist.7 At the end
of the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s, a considerable amount of the
obstacles to foreigners acquiring Swedish firms were abolished. This, together with
a general trend of more international mergers and acquisitions in most industrial
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Fig. 1 Share of employment in foreign-owned firms in Swedish manufacturing 1986–2002 (percent).
Note: Manufacturing firms with 20 employees or more. Firms are foreign-owned if foreigners have more
than 50% of the voting rights
7 A quotation from an official report (SOU 1986, p. 143) gives an indication of the sentiments at that
time: ‘‘kontrollen o¨ver svenska fo¨retag bevaras a˚t svenska intressen’’ (the control over Swedish firms
should be preserved to safeguard Swedish interests). See also Henrekson and Jakobsson (2002, p. 41).
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countries, constitute the main explanations for the increased foreign ownership in
Swedish business sector.8
Foreign-owned firms differ from domestically owned firms in many respects. Yet,
the crucial differences appear to exist between MNEs (foreign-owned firms and
Swedish MNEs), on the one hand, and non-MNEs, on the other. Bandick (2008) shows
that MNEs in Swedish manufacturing pay higher wages, are larger, more capital and
skill intensive, and have higher productivity than non-MNEs. By now it is well
documented that the gaps between MNEs and non-MNEs (even after controlling for
firm and industry characteristics) are more pronounced than those between foreign-
owned and domestically owned firms.9 The multinationality of firms is thus more
important than foreign ownership per se. Access to superior technology and being part
in an international network are factors that may give rise to these performance gaps.
Since our main interest is associated with skill upgrading when firms become
foreign-owned, we begin by taking a closer look at the development of skill
intensities (shares of the employees with a post-secondary education) in our three
types of firms: foreign-owned firms, Swedish MNEs and non-MNEs. Swedish
MNEs are Swedish owned firms that have at least one affiliate abroad or are part of
an enterprise group with affiliates abroad. Non-MNEs are firms that are neither
Swedish MNEs nor foreign-owned firms.
From Fig. 2, it is clear that the share of skilled labor has been growing
continuously in foreign-owned firms ever since 1986. From 1993 onwards, we are
able to separate the domestically owned firms into Swedish MNEs and non-MNEs.
The skill intensity levels are higher in MNEs than in non-MNEs; in 2002 the median
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Fig. 2 Share of skilled labor in foreign-owned firms, 1986–2002, in Swedish MNEs and non-MNEs,
1993–2002, median (percent)
8 Other explanations put forward are that: (i) the Swedish tax system has favored foreign ownership at the
expense of private Swedish ownership, (ii) the depreciation of the Swedish krona at the beginning of the
1990s entailed that Swedish firms were particularly cheap to acquire, (iii) the Swedish ‘‘business climate’’
improved in the 1990s as compared to the 1980s, and (iv) due to the Swedish membership in the EU it has
become more inviting to acquire Swedish firms. Jonung (2002) emphasizes the importance of the tax
system, while the other explanations are discussed in, e.g., Malmberg and So¨lvell (1998).
9 See, e.g., Doms and Jensen (1998).
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in foreign-owned firms and Swedish MNEs is around 15%, while it is just below 10%
in non-MNEs. This suggests that the relative labor demand pattern differs between
MNEs and non-MNEs. Yet we observe similar trends in skill shares in all types of
firms, which means that there has been an overall increase in the share of skilled labor
in Swedish manufacturing. Is this development due to the expansion of higher
education in the 1990s or is it a result of high relative demand for skilled labor?
2.2 Growing skill shares—larger supply of skilled labor or increased demand
for skills?
A simple model, where factors on the demand and supply side interact, has often been
used to explain trends in relative employment and relative wages of skilled labor.
While much of the international literature emphasizes factors on the demand side—
skilled-biased technical change and increased competition from low-wage coun-
tries—some Swedish social scientists stress explanations on the supply side. Edin and
Holmlund (1995) examine the relative wages of skilled labor (university wage
premiums) from the late 1960s until the beginning of the 1990s and their finding is that
the development is consistent with changes in the relative supply of skilled labor
(individuals with a university education). Le Grand et al. (2001) a group of sociologists
that has studied the Swedish labor market in the 1990s in an official report, conclude
that the supply of skilled labor has grown faster than employers’ demand.
In Fig. 3, we plot the share of skilled labor together with the relative wages
between skilled and less-skilled labor over the period 1993–2002. This gives a hint
as to whether changes on the demand or the supply side are most influential in
explaining the development of the skill share in manufacturing. Factors on the
demand side appear to be more important if the growing skill share in
manufacturing is accompanied by increased relative wages. The university wage
premium for individuals in manufacturing is used as a measure of relative wages.
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Fig. 3 Relative wages and skill share in Swedish manufacturing 1993–2002. Note: The relative wages
between skilled and less-skilled labor are calculated from estimated wage equations (see Table 4 in
Appendix 1). Skilled labor is individuals with 3 years of university education and less-skilled labor has
3 years of upper secondary school. The relative employment of skilled labor is the share with post-
secondary education in total manufacturing employment
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We get the university wage premium from estimating a standard Mincerian wage
equation on a new, large data set on individual wages (see Appendix 1). We
compare individuals with at least 3 years of university education to those with
3 years of upper secondary school.10 The skill share is the share of employed in
manufacturing with some post-secondary education.
Figure 3 shows some interesting patterns. First, we observe a significant increase
in the relative wages of skilled labor (the university wage premium) in
manufacturing over the period studied 1993–2002. In 1993, skilled labor wages
in manufacturing are 38% higher than less-skilled labor wages, whereas in 2002
skilled labor wages are 45% higher, i.e., between 1993 and 2002 the relative wages
of skilled labor have increased by 7 percentage points. Our result deviates from that
of Le Grand et al. (2001) who only found small changes in the relative wages of
skilled labor, yet it is in line with Gustavsson (2004).11
Second, we can see that in Fig. 3, relative employment and relative wages of
skilled labor move in the same direction. This indicates that although the supply of
skilled labor has increased, factors on the demand side appear to dominate in
explaining the growing skill share in manufacturing. Given the relative importance
of factors on the demand side, it seems reasonable to base the analysis of how
foreign ownership affects advanced production in Sweden on a framework that aims
at explaining relative demand for skilled labor, where the effects of foreign
ownership are then taken into account.
3 Relative labor demand and foreign ownership
3.1 Analytical framework
To study how foreign ownership affects relative demand for skilled labor, we follow
the commonly applied approach of Berman et al. (1994).12 The derivation of the
econometric specification starts out from a translog cost function, where skilled and
less-skilled labor are variable factors and physical capital is treated as a fixed factor.
By assuming cost minimizing firms a firm’s wage bill share of skilled labor PW is a
function of the relative wages of skilled labor (ws/wu), capital stock K, real output Y,
and technological level T.13 Relative labor demand can be estimated at the firm level
using the following regression equation:
PWjt ¼ aþ b1 lnðws=wuÞit þ b2 ln Kjt þ b3 ln Yjt þ b4Tjt þ ejt; ð1Þ
10 Table 4 in Appendix 1 shows the results from the estimated wage equations in 1993 and 2002.
11 Le Grand et al. (2001) base their estimate on LNU (Swedish Level-of-Living Survey), where the
number of individuals is relatively low; less than 1,800 each year. Gustavsson (2004) uses LINDA
(Longtudinal Individual Data for Sweden), where the number of individuals is much larger (16,117 in
1992 and 61,035 in 2000). The wage variable in Gustavsson (2004) is the same as ours, i.e., full time
equivalent monthly wages in logs, and is from Statistics Sweden’s wage statistics, whereas wage in Le
Grand et al. (2001) is log hourly wage.
12 The same method has been used by, e.g., Author et al. (1998) and Machin and Van Reenen (1998).
Anderton et al. (2002) and Hansson (2000) and (2005) are applications on Swedish data.
13 See, e.g., Berndt (1991, Sect. 9.) for a derivation.
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where j indicates firms, i industry and t time and a is an intercept and e is an error
term.
An increase in the dependent variable PWjt —a level change in the skill-labor share
of the total wage bill—indicates skill upgrading in firm j. As mentioned above our
definition of skilled labor is based on educational attainment; skilled labor is
employees with a post-secondary education, i.e., with more than 12 years of
schooling.14
The relative wage regressor ln(ws/wu)it accounts for changes in P
W due to
substitution away from a more expensive factor. The coefficient b1 is positive
(negative), depending on whether the average elasticity of substitution is below
(above) 1. Due to lack of good measures of the relative wage between skilled and
less-skilled labor many researchers have omitted the relative wage variable. If there
is perfect labor mobility, relative wages are the same in all industries and time fixed
effects will capture relative wages. Other researchers have constructed skilled (less-
skilled) labor wages ws(wu) by dividing wage bills for skilled (less-skilled) labor
with total employment of skilled (less-skilled) labor. One problem is that such wage
measures consist of the same terms as the dependent variable, PW, which might
introduce bias into the estimates. Another problem is that the constructed wages do
not take cross-industry variations in skill mix into account. An improvement on the
previous studies is that we have access to a new, large data set on individual wages
from which we calculate relative wages in 23 manufacturing industries for every
year over the period studied.15 In our estimated model we use this variable as a
measure of exogenous relative wages that firms in the various industries face at each
year t.
A positive coefficient on ln Kjt(b2 [ 0) indicates that skilled labor is comple-
mentary to physical capital in the production process. Whether real value added Yjt
is related to the skilled labor share of the total wage bill is shown by the estimate of
b3. As a proxy of the technology level Tjt, we employ the R&D intensity RD/Q, i.e.,
R&D expenditure as a share of sales. New technologies are continuously introduced
at a high rate in R&D intensive firms and if technological change shifts labor
demand in favor of better-educated workers, b4 is positive.
16 To take into
consideration that it takes time before R&D turn into new technologies, we lag
R&D intensity 2 years.
14 Most likely, such a division into skilled and less-skilled labor is more appropriate than the often used
production/non-production classification (e.g., in Blonigen and Slaughter 2001) or a distinction between
operatives and non-operatives (e.g., in Taylor and Driffield 2005). However, educational attainment also
has its imperfections, for instance, it does not capture experience, it partially understates participation in
further education and training, and there are variations in quality of schooling over time and between
regions/countries.
15 Appendix 1 gives a description of this data and how we obtain relative wages on industry level.
Table 5 in Appendix 1 shows our calculated relative wages between skilled and less-skilled labor in the
23 manufacturing industries in year 2002 and annual average changes in relative wages 1993–2002.
16 Taylor and Driffield (2005) construct R&D stocks and weigh them with value added to obtain an
intensity measure at the industry level of technological change, whereas Blonigen and Slaughter (2001)
employ the share of computer investment in total investment.
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To analyze the effect of foreign ownership on relative demand for skills, we
append to the wage bill share equation in Eq. 1 regressors that aim to capture such
an impact. We have argued that there will be a direct effect at the firm level of
foreign ownership and we add a dummy variable FOjt that equals 1 if firm j is
foreign-owned at time t.
Taylor and Driffield (2005) put forward additional arguments for why increased
inward FDI may widen the wage gap between skilled and less-skilled labor and give
rise to the use of more skilled labor. Technology spillovers from entering foreign
firms through the acquisition of domestic firms may increase the relative demand for
skilled labor also in non-acquired domestic firms within the same industry. A larger
foreign presence in an industry may lead to increased competition among firms,
especially for skilled labor which, in turn drives up the relative wages of skilled
labor. We expect to capture such effects of larger foreign presence by including the
share of employment in foreign-owned firms in industry i at time t SFDIit.
Equation 2 shows the firm fixed effect model we eventually estimate17:
PWjt ¼ b1ðws=wuÞit þ b2ln Kjt þ b3 ln Yjt þ b4ðRD=QÞjt2 þ c1FOjt þ c2SFDIit
þ ðTDÞt þ fj þ ejt ð2Þ
Our key variables are FOjt and SFDIit. The sign on the c coefficients indicates
whether inward FDI has an impact on the relative demand for skills. The
interpretation of significantly positive (negative) estimates of the gamma coeffi-
cients is that increased foreign ownership has contributed to shifts in demand
towards skilled (less-skilled) workers. (TD)t is time dummies and fj is time-invariant
firm fixed effects.
3.2 Empirical results
We carry out our econometric analysis at the firm level and we include into the
analysis all firms in manufacturing with 50 employees or more during the period
1993–2002.18 Firms that switch between domestic and foreign ownership more than
once over the period and firms that disappear from the sample 1 year and reappear
in later years are excluded. Table 1 presents the results. Column (1) comprises all
firms, whereas in columns (2) and (3) we have divided the domestic firms into
17 We would have preferred to also include a variable measuring increased competition from (and
offshoring to) low-wage countries, e.g., the share of consumption in an industry that is based on imports
from low-wage countries. Unfortunately, owing to changes in the classification of origins of imports after
Sweden’s accession to the EU, there is a large drop in the time series (Hansson et al. 2007, Fig. 7.9).
From 1995 and onwards, imports originating from outside the EU, but cleared through the customs in
another EU country, are falsely registered as imports from the transit EU country. Apparently, this entails
that the amount of imports from low-wage countries is underestimated.
18 Data on expenditure on R&D are only available in firms with 50 employees or more. However, we
have also estimated the model in Eq. 2 using all manufacturing firms with 20 employees or more and
replaced the R&D intensity at the firm level with other technology indicators: the share of employees with
post-secondary science or technical education and the industry level R&D intensity. This does not
qualitatively affect our results, which can be sent upon request. The reason why our period of analysis
begins in 1993 is that from 1993 onwards we are able to separate domestically owned firms into Swedish
MNEs and non-MNEs. This is an important distinction for the outcome as will be clear from Table 1.
Moreover, there is a new industry classification in 1993.
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Swedish MNEs and non-MNEs to see whether increased foreign ownership affects
skill upgrading differently in different types of firms. In column (4) we include both
Swedish MNEs and non-MNEs.19
From column (1) in Table 1 we infer that, in general, there is no direct effect on
skill upgrading in firms that become foreign owned. The coefficient on the dummy
variable FO is insignificant. On the other hand, there seems to be a positive indirect
effect of increased foreign presence in an industry on the demand for skills in
domestically owned firms within the same industry. The coefficient on FDI is
positive and significant.20
Some interesting patterns appear when we separate the domestically owned firms
into non-MNEs and Swedish MNEs in columns (2) and (3). Relative demand for
skilled labor increases in non-MNEs acquired by foreigners, whereas there seems to
be no such effect on relative labor demand in acquired Swedish MNEs. The
coefficient on FO is positive and significant in column (2), but insignificant in
Table 1 Impact of foreign ownership (inward FDI) on skill upgrading in Swedish manufacturing, 1993–
2002
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4)
All firms Non-MNE Swedish MNEs Swedish
MNEs and
non-MNEs
Relative wage ln(ws/wu) -0.021 (2.76)*** -0.024 (2.67)*** -0.004 (0.41) -0.039 (3.31)***
ln(ws/wu) 9 MNE 0.039 (2.84)***
Capital stock ln K 0.002 (2.58)*** 0.003 (2.72)*** 0.004 (3.34)*** 0.001 (1.49)
Output ln Y -0.008 (7.24)*** -0.010 (7.14)*** -0.008 (5.33)*** -0.010 (7.66)***
R&D intensity (RD/Q) 0.090 (4.13)*** 0.111 (3.80)*** 0.081 (3.32)*** 0.050 (2.07)***
Dummy variable:
Foreign-owned = 1 FO
0.003 (1.62) 0.005 (1.96)** 0.002 (0.64) 0.001 (0.41)
Share of employees
in foreign-owned firms FDI
0.001 (2.09)** -0.000 (-0.04) 0.002 (2.20)** 0.001 (1.41)
Time dummies TD Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 within 0.221 0.212 0.214 0.242
R2 between 0.004 0.004 0.014 0.006
R2 overall 0.005 0.006 0.009 0.002
Number of observations 9,342 6,375 5,490 7,560
Firm fixed effect model. Dependent variable: Skilled labor wage-bill share PW. Skilled labor is employees
with a post-secondary education. Firms that switch from being foreign owned to becoming domestically
owned are excluded in all specifications. t-statistics are within parentheses
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively
19 More specifically, column (2) includes non-MNEs and foreign-owned firms and column (3) Swedish
MNEs and foreign owned firms. In column (4), foreign owned firms as well as Swedish MNEs and non-
MNEs are included. Unlike in column (1), we exclude in columns (2–4) firms that switch from being non-
MNEs to becoming Swedish MNEs and vice versa.
20 Taylor and Driffield (2005) find also positive impact of increased inward FDI in an industry on the
relative demand for skills in UK manufacturing firms within the same industry.
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column (3). An interpretation consistent with this result is that technology transfers
leading to skilled-biased technical change play an important role in non-MNEs
taken over by foreigners, while technology sourcing is the essential motive behind
foreign acquisitions of Swedish MNEs.
The impact of larger foreign presence in an industry is positive on relative
demand for skilled labor in Swedish MNEs within the same industry, while it has no
effect on non-MNEs. The coefficient on FDI is positive and significant in column
(3) but insignificant in column (2). One explanation might be that increased foreign
ownership in an industry intensifies the competition for skilled labor, above all
between foreign MNEs and Swedish MNEs, which drives up the wages of skilled
labor in Swedish MNEs to a larger extent than in non-MNEs.
Interestingly, we also find that the elasticity of substitution between skilled and
less-skilled labor appears to differ between Swedish MNEs and non-MNEs. The
elasticity of substitution is significantly larger than one in non-MNEs (columns (2)
and (4)), whereas we cannot reject the hypothesis of an elasticity of substitution
equal to one in Swedish MNEs (column (3)). In fact, we observe in column (4),
where we interact the relative wage ln (ws/wu) with a dummy variable MNEjt = 1 if
firm j is a Swedish MNE or a foreign-owned firm at time t, that the elasticity of
substitution between skilled and less-skilled labor differs significantly in MNEs and
in non-MNEs. One reason put forward for the often observed higher productivity in
MNEs is that MNEs possess firm-specific assets and, presumably, it is skilled labor
that has most knowledge about this asset. Accordingly, MNEs might be more
concerned about worker turnover than non-MNEs, because this knowledge can leak
out to competitors as employees change jobs. This might be a motive for why MNEs
are paying a higher wage premium to skilled labor than to less-skilled labor.21 It
might also be an explanation for why the elasticity of substitution between skilled
and less-skilled labor is significantly smaller in MNEs than in non-MNEs.
In all specifications in Table 1, the output coefficient ln Y is negative, which
indicates that firms that reduce their production lower their demand for less-skilled
labor more than for skilled labor. The coefficient on capital ln K is positive in all
specifications, except in column (4), which means that there is evidence of capital-
skill complementarities. Finally, we observe that, as in most other similar studies,
the coefficient on R&D intensity (RD/Y) is positive, which has been interpreted as
technological change being an important driving force for the growing demand for
skills.
3.3 Propensity score matching and difference-in-difference
Matching has recently become a quite popular method for investigating ex post
performance of foreign ownership.22 The matching approach means that for
each domestically owned firm that becomes foreign-owned (treated units) the
21 The estimated MNE wage premium for skilled workers in Swedish manufacturing during the period
studied is 5.2% as compared to an MNE wage premium for less-skilled workers of 3.4–2.2% (Bandick
2008). Lipsey (2004) surveys the literature on the wage premium associated with foreign ownership.
22 See, e.g., Girma and Go¨rg (2007) and Huttunen (2007).
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investigator attempts to find other similar firms that continue to be domestically
owned (non-treated units). In other words, the idea is to try to construct a sample of
non-acquired twin firms to acquired firms to approximate for the non-observed
counterfactual event, i.e., what would have happened to relative labor demand of
skilled labor in acquired firms, on average, had they not been acquired by a foreign-
owned firm.
Matching involves pairing acquired with non-acquired firms with similar pre-
acquisition characteristics, X, e.g., productivity, age, size etc. The method we adapt
is propensity score matching due to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). This technique
has the advantage of summarizing all observables X into a single index variable. To
implement propensity score matching we begin by estimating the probability (or
propensity score) of being acquired by a foreign firm using a probit model
pðAFit ¼ 1Þ ¼ FðXit1; Dj; DtÞ; ð3Þ
where AFit = 1 if a domestically owned firm in year t - 1 becomes foreign-owned
in year t. Xit-1 is a vector of relevant firm-specific characteristics in year t - 1,
which may affect the firm’s probability of being acquired in year t. Dj and Dt control
for industry and time fixed effects. Once the propensity scores are calculated, we
can (by using the ‘‘calliper’’ matching method) select the nearest control firms in
which the propensity score falls within a pre-specified radius as a match for an
acquired firm.23
After having identified the control group of firms, we proceed and estimate the
impact of foreign acquisition on the relative labor demand of skilled labor using a
difference-in-difference estimator. This estimator compares the difference in skilled
labor wage bill shares of the acquired (treated) firms A before t - 1 and after t ? s
s C 0 with our control group of non-acquired firms C. Formally, the parameter we
want to estimate is utþs ¼ ðPWAtþs  PWAt1Þ  ðPWCtþs  PWCt1Þ and it can be obtained by
regressing data pooled across the treated firms and the firms in the control group24
PWit1;tþs ¼ b0 þ b1AFi þ b2Aftertþs þ b3AFi  Aftertþs þ e; ð4Þ
where PWit1;tþs is our outcome variable (skilled labor wage bill share) in periods t - 1
to t ? s. AFi is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for acquired (treated) firms
A and 0 for non-acquired firms C. It controls for constant differences in skilled labor
wage bill shares between target firms and firms in the control group before the
acquisition. We define the dummy variable Aftert?s as taking the value of 1 in post-
acquisition years t ? s and 0 before acquisition t - 1. This dummy variable
captures aggregate period effects that are common between the two groups T and C.
Finally, the term AFi 9 Aftert?s is an interaction term between AFi and Aftert?s. Its
coefficient b3 represents the difference-in-difference (DiD) estimator of the effect of
acquisition on the acquired (treated) firms A, i.e., b3 = ut?s. An advantage of the
23 The procedure we utilize to match treated (acquired) firms with control (non-acquired) firms is the
PSMATCH2 routine in Stata version 9 described in Leuven and Sianesi (2003). In our analysis the pre-
specified radius is set to 0.01.
24 See Woolridge (2002).
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DiD estimator is that it eliminates unobserved time-invariant differences in skilled
labor wage bill shares between acquired and non-acquired firms.
To allow for different impacts of foreign acquisitions on relative demand for
skilled labor depending on whether a Swedish MNE or a non-MNE is acquired we
extend Eq. 4. We add in Eq. 5 below interaction variables between our key variable
AFi 9 Aftert?s (and the treatment dummy AFi) and dummies showing the status of
the acquired firm—Swedish MNE or non-MNE—before takeover; i.e., MNESi = 1
if firm i was a Swedish MNE and NMNEi = 1 if it was a non-MNE.
PWit1;tþs ¼ b0 þ b1MNESi  AFi þ b2NMNEi  AFi þ b3Aftertþs þ b4MNES  AFi
 Aftertþs þ b5NMNE  AFi  Aftertþs þ e:
ð5Þ
Table 2 summarizes the interpretation of the coefficients in the regression model
in Eq. 5. Moreover, in our empirical analysis below, we also include a vector of firm
characteristics to control for differences in observable attributes between firms.
3.4 Matching results: post-acquisition effects on relative demand for skills
To construct our sample of non-acquired (non-treated) firms with similar pre-
acquisition characteristics as the acquired (treated) firms, we estimate the propensity
score, the conditional probability of being acquired by a foreign firm, by using the
probit model in Eq. 3.25 There is no consensus, neither in the theoretical nor in the
empirical literature, on what causes foreign acquisitions. To evaluate different
specifications, we use the balancing condition which controls that each independent
variable does not differ significantly between treated and non-treated firms. This
means that only treated and non-treated firms with the same propensity score and
with the same distribution of their observable characteristics will be matched. A set
of explanatory variables that fulfill the balancing condition criterion is: firm labor
productivity, the firm’s employment relative to industry mean firm employment,
firm age, firm age squared and a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is a
Swedish MNE or not.
Table 2 Difference-in-difference estimator
Before acquisition After acquisition Difference
Acquired Swedish MNEs b0 ? b1 b0 ? b1 ? b3 ? b4 b3 ? b4
Acquired non-MNEs b0 ? b2 b0 ? b2 ? b3 ? b5 b3 ? b5
Non-acquired firms b0 b0 ? b3 b3
Difference between acquired
Swedish MNEs and non-acquired firms
b1 b1 ? b4 b4
Difference between acquired non-MNEs and
non-acquired firms
b2 b2 ? b5 b5
25 Table 6 in Appendix 2 shows the result from estimating the probit model.
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Another condition that must to be fulfilled in the matching procedure is the so-
called common support condition. This criterion implies that at each point in time, a
newly acquired (treated) firm is matched with non-target firms with propensity
scores only slightly larger or less than the target firm. Some treated firms may be
matched with more than one non-acquired firm, while acquired firms not matched
with a non-treated firm are excluded. Furthermore, since our purpose is to study
post-acquisition relative labor demand dynamics, we only include in the analysis
firms for which information is reported at least 3 years after acquisition.26
Eventually, we end up with a sample, henceforth denoted the matched sample,
which consists of 140 treated and 237 non-treated firms.27
To examine whether foreign acquisitions of Swedish owned firms have had any
effects on relative demand for skilled labor in post-acquisition years we estimate the
regression model in Eq. 5. Our dependent variable is the wage bill share of skilled
labor and the key estimates are the difference-in-difference (DiD) estimators b4 and
Table 3 Effects of foreign acquisitions on post-acquisition skill upgrading
Variables (1) (2)
DiD OLS DiD FE
MNESi 9 AFi 9 Aftert?s 0.004 (0.54) 0.005 (1.55)
NMNEi 9 AFi 9 Aftert?s 0.008 (0.93) 0.008 (2.37)**
MNESi 9 AFi 0.031 (1.77)*
NMNEi 9 AFi -0.015 (1.05)
Aftert?s -0.001 (0.23) -0.002 (1.07)
Relative wage 0.021 (0.54) 0.013 (0.84)
Capital stock -0.001 (0.04) 0.008 (4.30)***
Output 0.017 (1.81)* -0.008 (3.60)***
R&D intensity 1.123 (4.43)*** 0.117 (3.29)***
Year dummies Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes No
R2 0.631
R2 within 0.193
R2 between 0.073
R2 overall 0.046
Observations 2,227 2,227
Matched sample. Dependent variable: Skilled labor wage-bill share PW. Square brackets ( ) give White’s
heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively
26 Moreover, firms that switch back and forth between different ownership status and greenfield
operations are excluded.
27 Firms taken over by foreigners differ from non-targeted firms in many respects. This is shown by
Table 7 column (1) in Appendix 2. The aim of the matching procedure is to find a group of non-acquired
firms that displays similar characteristics as the group of acquired firms. Apparently, as we can see in
Table 7 column (2), the matching procedure seems to have been successful since the significant
differences between the acquired (target) and the non-acquired (non-target) firms have disappeared in the
matched sample.
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b5. Table 3 reports the effects of foreign take-overs on post-acquisition skilled labor
wage bill shares. The sample consists of matched firms remaining at least 5 years in
the panel.
In column (2), where we estimate a firm fixed effect (FE) model, the DiD
estimator indicates that foreign acquisitions have a positive impact on the
demand for skilled labor in acquired non-MNEs. The result is consistent with the
previous outcome in Table 1, where we included all firms in the analysis. We
also notice that the other firm variables, e.g., capital and output, have the same
effect as in Table 1. However, these results do not hold if, as in column (1), we
do not control for time-invariant firm-specific effects and estimate a standard
OLS model.
4 Concluding remarks
Sharply increased foreign ownership at a time of widening wage inequality and a
growing employment share of skilled labor at the aggregate level hint that there
might be significant technology transfers from abroad, leading to skilled-biased
technical change and increased relative demand for skilled labor. Our econometric
analysis indicates that technology transfers are important when non-MNEs are
acquired by foreign-owned firms. On the other hand, foreign acquisitions of
Swedish MNEs seem to be explained by technology sourcing, since such
acquisitions do not give rise to any effects on relative demand for skilled labor in
the acquired firms. Furthermore, no evidence is found for the concerns put forward
in the Swedish public debate that foreign-owned firms would move out skill-
intensive activities from Sweden.
Intensified competition for skilled labor in an industry, in particular between
foreign MNEs and Swedish MNEs, leading to higher wages of skilled labor might
explain why increased foreign presence in an industry has a positive impact on
relative demand for skilled labor in Swedish MNEs within the same industry, while
it has no effect on non-MNEs.
Reasonably, skilled employees have larger knowledge about an MNE’s firm-
specific assets than less-skilled employees. Therefore, one would expect that MNEs
are more concerned about skilled worker turnover than non-MNEs. This could
explain why MNEs are paying higher wage premia to skilled labor. It could also
explain the significantly lower elasticity of substitution between skilled and less-
skilled labor in MNEs than in non-MNEs that we observe in Swedish
manufacturing.
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Appendix 1: Definitions and sources of data
Individual wage data
The wage variable is full-time equivalent monthly wage and comes from Statistics
Sweden’s (SCB’s) annual study of wages in Sweden. This survey samples 50% of
the individuals in the private sector and includes all individuals in the public sector.
The sampling frame for the private sector consists of firms that are stratified
according to industry and firm size (number of employees). Random draws are made
within each stratum. Each year a new sample is drawn and larger firms have a higher
probability of being sampled. This means that small firms and individuals working
in smaller firms are underrepresented. The data set can be used to compare the wage
structure over time, but is unsuitable for panel analyses at the individual level.28
In addition to wages, we also have information about sex, age, and education.
Furthermore, we know in which firm (and industry) an individual is working and
thus, he/she can be linked to our firm data. We use the information to estimate
Mincer equations for each year over the period studied 1993–2002 for individuals
working in manufacturing (Fig. 3). To take into account that individuals working in
smaller firms are underrepresented, we weigh the regressions with the inverse of the
probabilities of different individuals being sampled. Table 4 presents the results for
1993 and 2002.
We also utilize the data from SCB’s annual study on wages to calculate relative
wages between skilled and less-skilled labor ws/wu in 23 manufacturing industries
that we use in our analysis of relative labor demand in Sect. 3. The industries are the
Table 4 Estimated wage equations 1993 and 2002 for manufacturing (dependent variable: log monthly
wage)
Regressors Manufacturing
1993 2002
Gymnasium B 2 years (Upper secondary school) 0.101 (0.003) 0.042 (0.003)
Gymnasium = 3 years (Upper secondary school) 0.199 (0.006) 0.138 (0.006)
University \ 3 years 0.249 (0.007) 0.255 (0.008)
University C 3 years 0.521 (0.011) 0.511 (0.009)
Graduate studies 0.723 (0.017) 0.727 (0.015)
Experience 0.021 (0.001) 0.022 (0.001)
(Experience)2/100 -0.032 (0.001) -0.034 (0.002)
Female -0.143 (0.004) -0.124 (0.005)
Constant 9.054 (0.020) 9.318 (0.026)
R-square 0.436 0.446
Number of observations 215,413 376,893
White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors within parentheses
28 See Bandick (2008).
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same as in SCB’s strata. Table 5 shows the industries, relative wages for 2002, and
annual average changes in relative wages between 1993 and 2002.
Other data
A summary of definitions and sources of the other variables we employ in the
analysis of labor demand in Sect. 3 is given below.
Wage incomes W: Total wage incomes of employees.
Table 5 Relative wages between skilled and less-skilled labor at the industry level
SNI92 Industry Relative
wage 2002
Annual average
change 1993–2002
15 ? 16 Food, beverages and tobacco 1.44 2.14
17 ? 18 ? 19 Textiles, apparel and leather 1.40 1.42
201 Sawmilling and planing of wood,
impregnation of wood
1.39 0.92
20–201 Other wood products 1.31 0.29
211 Pulp, paper and paperboard 1.35 1.80
212 Articles of paper and paperboard 1.47 0.97
22 Printing and publishing 1.24 0.30
23 Manufacture of coke,
refined petroleum products
and nuclear fuel
1.30 1.98
241 Basic chemicals 1.39 0.83
244 Drugs and medicines 1.47 0.03
24–241–244 Other chemicals and chemical products 1.38 0.49
25 Rubber and plastics 1.47 0.96
26 Stone, clay and glass 1.38 0.27
27 Basic metals 1.39 0.30
28 Metal products 1.48 1.87
29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c.a 1.46 1.77
30 Office machinery and computers 1.64 2.47
31 Electrical machinery 1.48 2.36
32 Communication equipment 1.52 2.05
33 Professional goods 1.49 1.81
34 Motor vehicles 1.39 1.71
35 Other transport 1.45 2.47
36 Other manufacturing 1.34 0.97
We obtain the relative wage between skilled and less-skilled labor in the following way. In SCB’s annual
study on wages, each industry is stratified into firm size classes in which firms are drawn randomly. In an
industry for each firm size class, we calculate the average wage for the observed skilled (less-skilled)
individuals. By using the actual number of skilled (less-skilled) employees in each firm size class, which
we get from RAMS, we then compute a weighted average wage of skilled (less-skilled) labor in each
industry. Finally, to obtain the relative wage, we divide the weighted average wage for skilled labor with
the corresponding wage for less-skilled labor
a n.e.c. is not elsewhere classified
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Source: Statistics Sweden (SCB), Register-based labor statistics (RAMS).
Wage incomes skilled labor WS: Wage incomes of employees with post-
secondary education.
Source: SCB, RAMS.
Skilled-labor wage bill share PW: PW = WS/W.
Capital stock K: Book value of buildings and machinery, 1991 prices.
Source: SCB, Financial accounts.
Real output Y: Value added, 1991 prices.
Source: SCB, Financial accounts.
R&D intensity RD/Q: RD: Expenditure on research and development, current
prices.
Source: SCB, R&D Statistics. Q: Production value, current prices.
Source: SCB, Financial accounts.
Share of employment in foreign-owned firms FDI. Foreign-owned firms are firms
where foreigners possess more than 50% of the voting rights.
Source: SCB, Financial accounts.
Appendix 2: Estimating propensity score and comparing matched
and unmatched samples
Tables 6 and 7.
Table 6 Probit model to estimate propensity score
Variables Probability of foreign acquisition
Labor productivity 0.197 (3.39)***
Relative employment 0.006 (2.27)**
Age -0.033 (2.24)**
(Age)2 0.001 (2.15)**
Swedish MNE 0.257 (4.47)***
Year dummies Yes
Pseudo R2 0.033
LR v2(13) 88.83
Observations 17,249
The dependent variable AFit = 1, if a domestically owned firm in year t - 1 becomes foreign owned in
year t. z-statistics is within parentheses. The explanatory variables are firm-specific characteristics in year
t - 1. Relative employment is firm employment relative to mean firm employment at the industry level
(three-digit). Labor productivity is value added per employee. Age is firm age and Swedish MNE is a
dummy variable indicating whether the firm is a Swedish MNE firm or not
***, ** indicate significance on the 1 and 5% level, respectively
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